Union militancy and left-wing leadership on London underground by Darlington, RR
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Leadership is central to the fundamental problem of how individual workers are 
transformed into collective actors, willing and able to create and sustain collective 
organisation, and to engage in collective action against their employers. Evidence of 
the important role of ‘leader’ shop stewards was provided in the pioneering studies of 
Batstone et al (1977; 1978). Other workplace studies over the last 25 years have 
also shown the importance of formal and informal shop-floor leaders and activists in 
influencing their members and shaping workers’ interests (Beynon, 1973; Nichols 
and Armstrong, 1976; Pollert, 1981; Terry and Edwards, 1988; Fosh and Cohen, 
1990; Scott, 1994). In an important attempt to draw some theoretical generalisations 
from these highly insightful descriptions of social processes at the workplace, Kelly 
(1997; 1998) has drawn on the work of several writers within the social movements 
and collective action tradition, in particular Tilly (1978), Fantasia (1988), McAdam 
(1988) and Gamson (1992, 1995). He underlines the crucial role that shop-floor 
leaders and activists play in the process of collectivisation. First, they help to 
construct a sense of grievance amongst workers, attributing blame onto employers 
and/or the state rather than to uncontrollable economic forces or events. Second, 
they promote a sense of group or social identity, which encourages workers to 
become aware of their common interests in opposition to those of the employers. 
Third, they urge workers to engage in collective action, a process of persuasion that 
is assumed to be essential because of the costs of such action and the inexperience 
of many people with its different forms and consequences. Fourth, they legitimate 
such collective action in the face of employers’ counter-mobilising arguments that it 
is illegitimate.  
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Nonetheless, as Kelly has acknowledged, although the role of leadership has 
attracted some attention within the field of industrial relations, there has been a 
tendency (with some exceptions, see Darlington, 1993; 1994; 1998; Gall, 1999; 
Fishman, 1995; Jeffreys, 1988; Kelly, 1998, Lyddon and Darlington, 2000; Mcllroy 
and Campbell, 1999; Mcllroy et al, 1999; Terry and Edwards, 1988) to underestimate 
the significance of left-wing leadership in trade union activity and mobilisation. The 
term ‘left-wing’ can be defined broadly to include those union activists who have a 
fixed affiliation to a far-left political party or are on the left of the Labour Party, as well 
as those independent non-party industrial militants who share class/socialist politics. 
Their specific role in the process of worker collectivisation and activity is usually 
completely ignored. Equally, there is little literature on the influence of organised left-
wing factions (based on the Communist Party or other more extreme left and 
Trotskyist organisations) within the unions’ policy making bodies (again with some 
exceptions, see Seifert, 1984; Undy at al 1981; 1996; Carter, 1997)). Yet trade 
unions are often the site of intense ideological struggles between different groups of 
activists about the definition of members’ interests and the most appropriate means 
for their pursuit. Moreover, such ideological struggles are also to be found within the 
collective bargaining arena, related to differing strategies of how to react to and 
confront employers. For example, is an employer’s demand for more flexible working 
practices something that should be accepted, negotiated over, or rejected out of 
hand with the threat of action if necessary? 
 
Recent workplace studies by Darlington (1993; 1994; 1998) have revealed the 
significance of shop stewards’ political affiliations, and the influence and leadership 
that groups of left-wing activists can exert on workplace activity. These studies show 
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that left-wing union representatives with an overtly ideological and solidaristic (rather 
than instrumental and individualistic) commitment to trade unionism, can play a 
crucial role in translating shop-floor discontent into a sense of injustice, which then 
enables them to mobilise workers for collective action against management. Whilst 
the political sympathies of left-wing union activists can vary, the common thread 
binding them together is a commitment to building the strength of workplace union 
organisation through an adversarial approach to managerial prerogative. Invariably 
this involves them in challenging alternative, usually more pragmatic and moderate, 
strategies advocated by other activists, as well as encouraging their members who 
might not share all their political/adversarial ideas to be prepared to engage in 
militant collective activity. In other words, it would appear that the politics of union 
leadership is an important ingredient, amongst other factors, to an understanding of 
the dynamics of workplace industrial relations and trade unionism.   
 
However, the model of militant trade unionism, advocated by left-wing political 
activists, has been castigated as being destructive and self-defeating (Bassett, 1986, 
Taylor, 1994). Many commentators (Ackers and Payne, 1998; TUC, 1998; Unions 
21, 1999) have recently argued that union survival and recovery in the 21st century 
will depend on the willingness of unions and their members to behave ‘moderately’ 
and to engage in a ‘social partnership’ between workers and employers. This 
emphasis on the mutual identity between trade unions and managers, aimed at 
improving corporate competitiveness in the private sector or service quality in the 
public sector, has been spelt out by the TUC in its ‘New Unionism’ project: ‘At the 
workplace social partnership means employers and trade unions working together to 
achieve common goals such as fairness and competition; it is a recognition that, 
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although they have different constituencies, and at times different interests, they can 
serve these best by making common cause wherever possible’ (TUC, 1997). It 
means abandoning an adversarial approach and accepting the need for co-operation 
in changing workplace culture in a more consensual direction. As Prime Minister 
Tony Blair argued recently: ‘Employment security and worthwhile jobs can only be 
delivered if trade union members are employed by successful organisations. The 
rhetoric of struggle, strikes and strife therefore has little resonance in today’s world of 
work’ (Guardian, 24 May 1999). Recent ‘social partnership’ agreements between 
Tesco and USDAW, Blue Circle and the AEEU and Panasonic and the GMB, have 
underlined the trend that is taking place (TUC, 1998; Labour Research, June 1998) 
However, not all unions have embraced ‘social partnership’ agreements, for example 
the NUM, FBU, and RMT are unions that retain adversarial traditions.  
 
In a further contribution to the debate Kelly (1996) has attempted to 
categorise unions as being either ‘militant’ or ‘moderate’, on the basis of five 
dimensions: goals, methods, membership resources, institutional resources, and 
ideology. In brief, ‘militant’ unions are defined as being willing to take industrial 
action, having an ideology of conflicting interests and relying strongly on the 
mobilisation of members. ‘Moderate’ unions are defined as taking industrial action 
infrequently or not at all, having an ideology of partnership and strongly relying on 
employers.  
 
Of course, it is acknowledged that militancy and moderation are best 
understood as two ends of a continuum, and that unions are not completely free 
agents in so far as their stance and behaviour result from an interaction with the 
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economic, political and industrial relations environment in which they find 
themselves. For example, the level of unemployment, employers’ (and state) 
behaviour, the nature of product and labour markets, and other factors will all create 
a more or less favourable environment for militancy or moderation. Unions may be 
militant on some dimensions, for example with very ambitious bargaining demands 
(for example, on pay), but moderate on others (for example, on restructuring). They 
may not always feel it necessary to organise industrial action, for example because 
their strategic bargaining position makes this unnecessary, and they may sometimes 
advocate a strategic retreat, for example because a large section of their members 
are unwilling to fight. Similarly, the overall balance of relations between capital and 
labour in Britain can have a profound impact on the general conditions in which 
militancy in any industry/workplace might thrive at the expense of moderation and 
vice versa. As Mcllroy (2000) has argued, the decline in working class militancy 
generally in Britain, particularly since the defeat of the 1984-5 miners’ strike, still 
constrains the response of trade unionists at all levels, as well as what left-wing 
activists can strategically seek to achieve. Nonetheless, if objective environmental 
factors provide, or undermine, potential power resources within the bargaining arena, 
the subjective factor is also important in terms of the forms to which, and whether, 
they are mobilised. Thus, whilst the collectivisation and mobilisation of the workforce 
into militant action can emerge spontaneously, it is also often constructed by leaders 
or activists who can provide important strategic and tactical guidance and direction.  
 
In other words, despite some qualifications, the broad distinction between 
‘militancy’ and ‘moderation’ is a useful analytical tool for contrasting the different 
approaches and behaviour adopted by unions. And such labels can be applied not 
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only to unions as a whole, but also to intra-union bodies such as regional or shop 
stewards’ committees, although a further distinction can also be made here between 
union militancy - with reference to the organisation as an entity, and labour militancy 
- with reference to workplace-based behaviour and activity (Gall, 2000). Significantly, 
the militancy/moderation axis can also be useful as a means by which to more fully 
appreciate the importance of left-wing leadership within trade unions, particularly in 
the light of the fact that those national unions that retain an adversarial tradition cited 
above, all have leaders at different levels of the organisation from a left-wing political 
persuasion. 
 
Kelly (1996; 1998) summarises some of the arguments used by those who 
advocate moderation. Within a highly intensified competitive world, unions have to 
moderate their demands and offer concessions to the employers or face the risk of 
job loss or de-recognition. Strikes are said to be ineffective insofar as they either fail 
to achieve their objectives or achieve them at such heavy financial cost to the 
strikers that they constitute Pyrrhic victories. It is also claimed there are various 
payoffs to moderate unionism, including job security, training, health and safety. By 
contrast, the arguments in favour of militancy include the view that the growing 
hostility of employers to any form of unionism and collective bargaining makes social 
partnership impossible to achieve; that compared with militancy gains from 
moderation are meagre, whether measured by membership increases or union 
strength and influence; and that moderation can seriously weaken trade unions and 
leave them vulnerable to employers’ attacks because they erode the willingness and 
capacity of members to resist and to challenge employer demands.  
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With such considerations in mind we can now turn to some case study 
research into trade union organisation within the London Underground, with the aim 
of further exploring the relationship between left-wing political leadership and trade 
union/labour militancy in one particular industry, namely the London Underground 
 
 
CASE STUDY: THE LONDON UNDERGROUND 
 
Despite the record low levels of industrial action generally in Britain during the 1980s 
and 1990s, trade unionism in the public sector has been much more resilient than in 
private industry, measured both by stability and density of membership, as well as by 
figures on industrial action (Millward et al, 1992; Cully et al, 1999). And within the 
public sector three of the main locations of union militancy – the Royal Mail, Fire 
Service and London Underground – appear to have been characterised by important 
common features, such as the influence of a monopoly service, buoyant markets and 
increased traffic volumes, the lack of compulsory redundancies, the homogeneity of 
large manual workforces with high union memberships, the immediate impact that 
strike action could potentially have, and the lack of any serious defeats for workers 
taking strike action, all of which have contributed to creating a favourable situation 
for workers to engage in militant activity to resist managerial restructuring compared 
with the more quiescent labour response generally (Beale, 1999; Fitzgerald and 
Stirling, 1999; Gall, 1995; Report, 2000). In addition, within important local areas of 
the Royal Mail and Fire Service, the influence of left-wing activists to such militancy 
has also been evident  (Darlington, 1993; 1998). 
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However, whilst some of these public-sector industries have been the subject 
of attention by industrial relations researchers the London Underground remains 
virtually unexplored territory (Urquhart, 1992). This is remarkable considering the 
centrality of the service to Britain’s capital city, the evident importance of the 
Underground lines and depots as major workplaces in their own right, and the fact 
that the industry experienced a relatively very high level of strike action throughout 
the 1990s [see table]. The series of 24 and 48-hour strikes by the National Union of 
Rail Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) during 1998 and early 1999 in 
opposition to Deputy Prime Minister John Prescot’s plans to part-privatise the 
London Underground through a Public Private Partnership (DofE, 1998), highlighted 
in graphic relief the adversarial nature of industrial relations on the Underground in 
recent years. 
 
 Of particular importance in understanding the nature of industrial relations on 
the London Underground is the influential role of its two main trade unions, notably 
the RMT and the Association of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF). 
Significantly, during the mid-late 1990s, there was the rise of a number of left-wing 
political activists to influential union positions within the RMT on the London 
Underground, many of these associated with the far left Socialist Labour Party (SLP) 
headed by the miners’ union leader Arthur Scargill. They included Pat Sikorski, 
secretary of the RMT London Underground District Council, and Bob Crow, RMT 
Assistant General Secretary with responsibility for the Underground. It seems likely, 
although hitherto has never been examined, that the influence of this left-wing 
political leadership has been reflected in the belligerent attitude adopted by the union 
and its members towards Underground management, and in the almost annual bouts 
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of industrial action. At the very least, it appears to have contributed to the militant 
resolutions in protest at Tony Blair’s alleged pro-business policies endorsed by 
delegates at recent annual union conferences, with a motion at the 1999 conference 
to end financial support for the Labour Party unless its policies on privatisation were 
reversed only narrowly defeated. And in 2000, London RMT members, following a 
recommendation by their left-wing leaders, voted by 91 per cent in favour of Ken 
Livingstone’s independent bid for London Mayor against New Labour’s candidate on 
a platform of opposition to privatisation of the Tube. Certainly, in many respects, the 
RMT on London Underground, with its left-wing leadership, seems to typify the 
image of so-called old-fashioned militant trade unionism which many commentators 
assumed had long ago been abandoned. ‘It is back to the bad old days, the bad old 
ways of the 1970s’ (Financial Times, 16 June 1998) as John Redwood, Shadow 
Trade and Industry spokesperson at the time, commented in 1998. 
 
By contrast, although there is an informal left-wing grouping based on the 
national railway network within ASLEF there has been a fairly conservative and right-
wing Labour tradition on the London Underground, albeit with an occasional militant 
industrial edge. Significantly, train drivers’ anger at the union leadership’s agreement 
to productivity changes with the privatised railway companies and its initial equivocal 
stance towards semi-privatisation of London Underground, appears to have been a 
major factor in the recent election of SLP member Dave ‘Micky’ Rix to the key post of 
General Secretary. But Rix’s position is an isolated one and the left does not have 
any real base on the Underground, although there was, like the RMT, strong support 
for Ken Livingstone. Certainly, whilst prepared to threaten and occasionally engage 
in strike action, the ASLEF leadership has traditionally taken a much less 
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confrontational stance than the RMT, and has refused on a number of occasions in 
recent years to support industrial action mounted by the RMT in defence of wages 
and conditions. It also voiced strong criticism of the RMT’s campaign of industrial 
action against the Public Private Partnership (Locomotive Journal, January 1998). 
The type of ‘social partnership’ advocated by the TUC has not been actively taken up 
by ASLEF. But compared with the RMT, the union has adopted a rather more 
collaborative posture on the London Underground. Such differences have been 
compounded by the history of difficult and sometimes very acrimonious relationships 
between the two unions (Bagwell, 1982; Pendelton, 1993). 
 
This article presents the findings of case study research into trade union 
organisation and activity on the London Underground with the aim of exploring two 
main research questions. First, to what extent have left-wing activists inside the RMT 
contributed to shaping the militant union response to management, encouraging the 
collectivisation and mobilisation of workers to produce the relatively high levels of 
strike action that have been recorded throughout the 1990s? Second, has this 
militant union strategy been effective in terms of obtaining material rewards for union 
members, or has it merely been self-defeating compared with the more moderate 
approach adopted by ASLEF? 
 
Most of the research evidence was obtained through extensive semi-
structured tape-recorded interviews with fifteen strategically placed informants of 
both militant and more moderate persuasions. These included RMT national officials, 
Regional Council reps, union branch officers and union members, as well as ASLEF 
branch officers and London Underground human resource managers. This was 
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supplemented by participant observation of RMT branch meetings and detailed 
analysis of RMT and ASLEF documentary material.  It involved examining not merely 
a snap-shot of contemporary features but an historical overview of the changing 
pattern of industrial relations and trade unionism on the London Underground from 
the late 1980s through to the late 1990s. 
 
The article is divided into four sections. First, the structure of the London 
Underground, and the nature of its workforce and trade union organisation, is 
outlined. The following three sections provide a chronological narrative and analysis 
of the dynamic nature of industrial relations and trade unionism on the Underground 
over the last ten years. Finally, some conclusions are made and wider assessment is 
drawn from the case study evidence.  
 
 
 
 
NATURE OF INDUSTRY AND WORKFORCE 
 
The London Underground is the largest underground transport network in the world. 
Its history dates back to 1863 when the world’s first Underground railway opened in 
London. The vast majority of the central London Underground lines were built before 
the First World War, with the suburban extensions largely being constructed in the 
period before and shortly after the Second World War (Howson, 1971). Since then, 
the most significant developments have been the building of the Victoria Line, which 
was opened in stages between 1968 and 1971, the extension of the Piccadilly Line, 
which reached Heathrow Airport in 1977 and Terminal Four in 1986, and the building 
  - 12 - 
of the Jubilee Line Extension, which was opened in 1979 and was extended to 
provide a link between central London and the Millennium Dome in 2000.  
 
The Underground network serves 253 stations, with 507 trains (all of which 
are now one-person operated, except for the Northern Line which has retained about 
400 guards pending the phasing in of a new fleet of trains). Trains run on over 244 
miles of track, around 42 per cent of which are in tunnels. Of the 12 different lines, 
seven (Bakerloo, Central, Victoria, Waterloo and City, Jubilee, Northern and 
Piccadilly) are ‘deep-tube’ and five (the Circle, District, Hammersmith and City, East 
London and Metropolitan) are ‘sub-surface’. The number of passengers has 
increased dramatically from 800 million in 1988 to 896 million in 1999, with the 
system now carrying nearly as many passengers as the entire national railway 
network (LT, 1999). There are currently about 3 million passenger journeys per day, 
with the busiest Underground stations (in terms of passengers starting/ending 
journeys or changing between lines) being Kings Cross, Oxford Circus and Victoria, 
with 69, 85 and 86 million annual passengers respectively (LT, 1999; 2000). 
 
London Underground Limited (LUL) is a wholly owned subsidiary of London 
Transport, which is responsible to the government for policy and performance. In 
2000 LUL announced record profits of almost £294 million (2000a). This financial 
success reflects increased passenger demand (with passenger journeys growing by 
7 per cent in the previous year alone) and the increased service levels (the number 
and frequency of trains) of almost 3 per cent which resulted (2000a). Despite this 
financial success, LUL has struggled for years with a tarnished image as passengers 
have been faced with having to battle daily with overcrowding, delays, cancellations, 
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unexplained stops in tunnels and out-of-order lifts and escalators. There is an urgent 
need for massive investment to replace old trains, extend lines and refurbish old 
equipment. In 1991 a Monopolies and Mergers Commission inquiry (MMC, 1991) 
found that ‘for the most part, the deficiencies in the levels of [Underground] service 
are the result of chronic under-investment’. Indeed, LUL has a legacy of under-
investment in the renewal of its infrastructure, compounded by cutbacks in subsidy 
by Conservative governments. An estimated £8 billion is required to upgrade the 
ailing network.  
 
Following its election victory in 1997, the New Labour government announced 
a Public Private Partnership (PPP) to secure long-term secured levels of investment 
for London Underground. It will mean that part of London Underground will continue 
to operate as a publicly owned, publicly accountable body responsible for the actual 
running of train and station services, albeit in an entirely new form. From July 2000 
London Transport’s responsibilities for the provision of public transport services were 
transferred to the new Greater London Authority, with an executive arm Transport for 
London responsible for implementing transport policy. However, notwithstanding 
strong opposition to the Tube sell-off mounted by Ken Livingstone, both before and 
since his election as London Mayor, the Underground’s infrastructure is to be 
‘mortgaged’ to private sector companies who will take on leases of up to 30 years 
and be responsible for delivering a massive infrastructure investment programme. 
This will involve refurbishing stations, maintaining tunnels, replacing tracks, 
upgrading signalling and replacing trains to achieve prescribed service standards. 
TfL will own the new London Underground Operating Company (Opsco) which will 
be responsible for managing the partnership with the private sector infrastructure 
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companies (InfraCos). The private companies will make money by charging London 
Underground for access to the network. Significantly, although the time-scale has 
slipped dramatically as a result of its complexity and political sensitivity and is 
unlikely to become operational until after the next general election, the PPP structure 
of the project will keep the London Underground away from direct control by the 
Mayor for at least seven years. 
 
 In order to facilitate the transition the operational side of the Underground is 
currently undergoing restructuring, but throughout the 1990s LUL was organised into 
various functional structures (including trains, stations, and engineering), with 
operational services managed by 8 separate Underground Line-based business 
units, as well as individual managers responsible for each depot. Overall, the 
Underground employs almost 16,000 staff, including 2,500 drivers, 500 guards, 
5,000 station staff, and 4,000 signal, track engineering, maintenance and workshop 
staff.  
 
The workforce is quite mixed in terms of gender and ethnicity, although this is 
not spread evenly across the network. Thus, the vast majority of drivers are men, 
with only about 120 women. And both are overwhelmingly white, although some train 
depots, for example at Seven Sisters, have a majority of black drivers. By contrast, 
most station staff are black, with many immigrant workers, although the proportion of 
men and women is much more evenly balanced. Engineering staff are almost 
exclusively male with a fairly mixed ethnic composition. The vast majority of the LUL 
workforce are on full-time contracts. It is a predominately fairly young workforce, with 
an average age of mid-to-late 30s.  Amongst station staff, the most poorly paid 
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section, there is a very high turnover of labour. All operating grades work a shift 
system, which stretches from one end of the day to another. For example, in a 
typical 4-week cycle train drivers are rostered to work anytime between 4.35am to 
1.30am the following day, alternating between two-week early and two-week late 
turns. Station staff have similar shift patterns. By contrast, track maintenance, station 
and tunnel cleaners work mainly through the night after the network has been closed 
to the public. 
 
Over 10,000 of London Underground’s 16,000-strong workforce are members 
of trade unions, primarily the RMT and ASLEF1. The RMT is an industrial union with 
about 6,500 members employed by LUL, overwhelmingly station, engineering and 
maintenance staff, but also about 600 drivers (mainly on the Victoria and Central 
Lines), as well as some 200 guards on the Northern line. ASLEF is an occupational 
union with about 2,000 members, almost all of whom are drivers and guards. The 
train drivers are undoubtedly the best-organised section on the Underground. This is 
partly related to their strategic bargaining position, which provides them with 
enormous potential power to paralyse the entire network through industrial action, 
and partly to their concentration in relatively large numbers at depots based at Tube 
stations, which provides a fairly cohesive organisation and collective group identity, 
with quite a high degree of interaction between drivers across different depots. This 
is reflected in almost 100 per cent trade membership amongst train drivers. By 
contrast, station staff are much less well organised, due to their fragmentation in 
fairly small units in hundreds of different centres. This is reflected in the relatively 
much lower levels of union organisation compared with train drivers or engineering 
staff based in depots located at Tube stations. 
  - 16 - 
  
ASLEF’s membership, overwhelmingly based amongst train drivers, is 
organised into 14 workplace union branches based on depots attached to 
Underground lines. There are some 40 ASLEF local reps. The different ASLEF 
workplace branches are linked together by a London District Council, but it is 
dominated by full-time officials and has little power or influence within the union. By 
contrast, the RMT has 16 union branches, most of which combine drivers, guards, 
station and engineering staff, and which are grouped around the 9 main 
Underground Lines. There are about 200 reps across the whole combine, including 
about 30 drivers’ reps. Compared with ASLEF, the RMT’s London Underground 
combine-wide District Council plays a much more important role in co-ordinating the 
activities of the different union branches and it exercises powerful leverage over the 
RMT executive committee member with responsibility for the London Underground 
and the full-time union officials based in head office. 
 
Collective bargaining on day-to-day issues takes place between ASLEF 
and/or RMT reps and managers at depots and stations, on each Underground Line 
and at overall combine-wide level. Substantive pay and conditions negotiations 
affecting the entire London Underground workforce take place at a centralised level 
between full-time union officials and LUL management. But local rep organisation is 
much more problematic amongst station staff than drivers, given that union reps 
have responsibility for a group of Tube stations, with some representing eight, nine 
or even ten stations, and often do not receive time off work. 
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To fully appreciate the significance of the left’s influence inside the RMT, and 
the contrast with ASLEF, it is necessary to consider the historical background to 
current events, to begin with exploring the important 1989 strike and the managerial 
restructuring of London Underground that followed in 1992.  
 
 
THE 1989 DISPUTE AND 1992 COMPANY PLAN 
 
Although many groups of other workers in a variety of industries were defeated in 
confrontations with the Conservative government and employers during the 1980s, 
the London Underground had a relatively more co-operative industrial relations 
atmosphere, at least until 1989. Throughout this period although public transport was 
included in the Conservative government’s privatisation programme, no plans were 
revealed for London Underground. Moreover, the Tube’s strategic role, serving the 
transport needs of millions of commuters in the country’s capital, encouraged some 
managerial caution in encroaching too forcefully on union influence given the 
devastating impact any potential stoppage of work could have. But by the late 1980s 
London Transport came under intense financial pressure as a result of a continual 
reduction in government subsidies, which were cut by nearly half between 1984-88 
(Urquhart, 1992). In turn, this obliged LUL management to seek cost savings, 
attempting to transform the long-established working practices, which it argued 
encouraged inefficiency.  
 
In 1989 a new initiative called ‘Action Stations’ was announced, designed to 
introduce more flexible working practices and changes to the transfer and promotion 
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arrangements. Meanwhile, management also began to take stiffer disciplinary 
measures against ‘unsatisfactory attendance’, threatened to introduce more 
competitive tendering of maintenance and renewal work, and offered only a minimal 
pay rate for the introduction of One Person Operated trains (Urquhart, 1992). Faced 
with this management attack on pay and conditions, there was an immediate 
response by members and grassroots activists, with five unofficial one-day 
stoppages organised by NUR train staff (drivers and guards), which eventually led 
the union leadership to organise an official ballot for industrial action. Despite a High 
Court injunction enforcing a re-ballot, there was an overwhelming majority in favour 
of action, leading to six 24-hour strikes. Meanwhile, inside ASLEF, there was an 
even more determined membership revolt, with a series of 8 one-day unofficial 
stoppages by train staff, before the union balloted its members and organised a 
further four official one-day strikes (involving a number of joint days of action 
between the two unions).  
 
A number of non-party affiliated left-wing ASLEF driver activists on the 
Piccadilly Line, who had been involved in producing a regular 12-page Picc up on 
the East bulletin for a number of years arguing for militant union action independently 
of union officials, were central to the unofficial strikes’ initiation. They also helped 
organise regular mass meetings of strikers with ‘co-ordinators’ from across all the 
London Underground depots. The acceptance by the ASLEF and the NUR national 
leadership of the compromise recommendations of a mediators’ panel caused 
considerable bitterness and a further unofficial strike by ASLEF train staff, although 
in the process management was forced to concede virtually all its productivity goals 
(Beardwell, 1989; Woodward, 1998). 
  - 19 - 
 
 In 1992 LUL pressed ahead with a systematic plan to introduce completely 
new contracts of employment and working arrangements across the whole network. 
These involved more flexible shift patterns (involving longer working hours), shorter 
holidays, new payment systems, the end of promotion through seniority and the 
introduction of new ‘unsatisfactory attendance’ procedures. It also aimed for a 
reduction of the workforce by one quarter, with a significant cutback in the number of 
drivers. In addition, management drew up proposals to reconstruct fundamental 
elements of its industrial relations system with a devolution of collective bargaining 
structures. The combined package of changes, known as the Company Plan was 
presented to the unions virtually fait accompli with little negotiation. It represented a 
major challenge to workers’ conditions and threatened to seriously weaken union 
strength.  ASLEF mounted no real resistance, fearing to jeopardise the relatively 
high redundancy packages that some of its older drivers were set to receive. 
Following a series of angry union branch meetings, the RMT obtained a massive 
ballot vote in favour of strike action. But apprehensive of the negative political 
consequences of taking action on the Labour Party’s chances of winning the May 
1992 general election, and after obtaining an assurance that Labour would have the 
Company Plan withdrawn in the event of victory, the RMT officials held back from 
organising action. When the Conservative government was re-elected they 
abandoned resistance, and the Company Plan was introduced at the end of the year, 
obliging all staff to sign new personal contracts. An East Finchley ASLEF activist  
related: 
 
The unions were hoping that Labour would win the election and that would solve all their 
problems, but of course the Tories were elected and then everyone said ‘We’re doomed’. 
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With the Tories in power there was a feeling of inevitability about it. And in the run-up to 
Christmas we were just slapped with new contracts and told ‘Sign them or you’re out in 
January’. There was no organised resistance by the unions whatsoever. They said we 
wouldn’t be able to stop it through one-day strikes like in 1989, it would have to be all-out, and 
that wasn’t going to happen, so we’d have to accept it. 
 
The imposition of the Company Plan represented a serious defeat for union 
organisation on the Underground (although its passage was sweetened by a 
subsequent significant pay rise of 6 per cent for train staff). During 1993-4 some 
5,000 jobs were lost, including about 400 drivers. Confronted with new collective 
bargaining machinery, both unions were thrown into some disarray. Ironically though, 
the sweeping job cuts which occurred in the wake of the Company Plan not only 
lowered the average age of the workforce, but also gradually led to the emergence of 
a new layer of left-wing union activists to prominence. 
 
 
THE RISE OF THE LEFT AND THE GROWTH OF RESISTANCE: 1992-1997 
 
Over twenty of the leading RMT and ASLEF senior reps and branch officers on the 
Underground, some of whom had been responsible for collective bargaining under 
the old structure, retired or took voluntary redundancy. But there was a marked 
divergence in the impact on both unions. Inside ASLEF, if anything there was a 
political shift to the right. Some of the key left-wing activists who had organised the 
unofficial action in 1989 either accepted redundancy or took up new management 
jobs that became available, and the vacant union positions tending to be filled by 
less militant individuals. But inside the RMT there was the gradual coalescence of a 
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new formation of left-wing political activists at grassroots level, who were determined 
to re-build the strength of the union through organising rear-guard opposition to 
management. 
 
 A key event in this process was the sacking of a Trotskyite RMT driver 
activist, and Leytonstone Station union rep, Pat Sikorski in the summer of 1993. A 
ballot and one-day strike by Central Line drivers and guards, and the threat of 
escalation across the whole combine, forced management to reinstate him. The 
sacking was seen as blatant victimisation by management, and the union’s victory 
considerably boosted the morale of activists generally. Sikorski was catapulted into 
prominence and elected onto the national union executive and later became 
secretary of the London Underground RMT Regional Council. In these positions he 
was to play a central organising role encouraging other left-wing RMT branch 
activists and union reps to build up militant union opposition to management. During 
the early 1990s, the left inside the RMT on the Underground was composed of about 
20-30 individuals, including two or three Trotskyists and ex-members of the 
Communist Party and a larger grouping of Labour Party left-wingers, although most 
could be described as independent non-party industrial militants. This left-wing 
influence became most evident on the Regional Council, which (dominated by 
drivers, the best-organised section) began to play a principal role in the adoption of 
official militant union policies towards management and the co-ordination of the 
activities of the hitherto fragmented union branches. Although operating primarily as 
a network of industrial militants, rather than more explicitly political, it also wielded 
sufficient official union authority to lead a combine-wide campaign of strike action to 
defend pay and conditions over the next few years.  
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But the union militancy that ensued was also related to perceived intransigent 
managerial policy. Thus, LUL management continued to attempt to assert its 
authority within the industrial relations arena at combine-wide level, with the aim of 
introducing further efficiency measures, in the process creating a continuing brittle 
relationship with both main unions. However, they utilised a classic divide-and-rule 
negotiating strategy aimed at stymieing the potential of united action between the 
RMT and ASLEF. This was done by playing on the differences in bargaining position 
between the two unions and being prepared to concede more generous concessions 
to drivers (mainly organised by ASLEF) compared with other sections. As one 
Employee Relations manager, who was interviewed, explained: ‘Our attitude has 
been to try and work in co-operation with ASLEF because we recognise, and it might 
be a bit cynical, that the train drivers have more power than anybody to stop our 
services’. A pattern of disputes ensued in which the RMT, attempting to represent 
station and engineering staff as well as drivers, adopted a more militant stance.  
 
In 1994 both ASLEF and RMT threatened industrial action in response to a 2 
per cent pay offer, but when it was increased by half a per cent after negotiations at 
ACAS, ASLEF accepted the deal. They argued it was the best that could be 
achieved given the generally unfavourable economic and political climate. By 
contrast, the RMT, concerned about conditions of work as much as about pay levels 
for its multi-grade members, balloted for 24-hour strike action amongst its entire 
Underground membership. The RMT Regional Council, under the influence of its left-
wing elements, campaigned amongst the members with a series of mass meetings 
on the basis that LUL was a highly profitable organisation and that industrial action 
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could force management to make concessions, irrespective of ASLEF’s decision. In 
a number of large union branches they won this argument. But although the union 
obtained an overwhelming majority vote in favour, it was on a low turn-out and the 
strike was very patchy, with LUL claiming they were able to run three quarters of its 
train services with only one Tube station having to close. In so far as the RMT, left 
isolated by ASLEF, ended up accepting the original offer, the dispute achieved little. 
Nonetheless, many union activists, even beyond those on the left, viewed it as very 
important in ‘laying the ghost of 1992’ and demonstrating the union could still mount 
combine-wide action against management. Determined to punish the RMT for such 
belligerence, management (using one union branch’s alleged procedural irregularity) 
withdrew the union pay-roll check-off facility across the network, whilst leaving it 
intact for ASLEF. It had the immediate effect of reducing RMT membership by a few 
hundred across the combine, although it also obliged the new union reps to go out 
and build a closer relationship with the workforce. 
 
 The 1995 annual pay and conditions campaign further emboldened the 
strength of the RMT, and its increasingly left-led Regional Council on the 
Underground. On this occasion, both ASLEF and the RMT obtained massive strike 
ballot majorities in response to what was regarded as a highly insulting 2.75 per cent 
pay offer from management, and announced a joint 24-hour strike. However, ASLEF 
called their strike off when LUL obtained a High Court injunction making the union’s 
participation illegal on the basis that its ballot paper wording had been nullified by an 
improved company offer of 3 per cent. The RMT then decided to abandon its own 
planned strike, even though it was unaffected by the injunction as its ballot wording 
had been more general. Following further negotiations, ASLEF obtained a promised 
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one-hour reduction in the working week, as well as 3 per cent pay increase for 
drivers, and recommended acceptance of the deal by its members. It represented a 
significant concession by management to the drivers, and was clearly designed to 
isolate the RMT. Nonetheless, the RMT went ahead and organised three 24-hour 
combine-wide stoppages of its entire membership in a campaign for a 6 per cent pay 
rise, for a reduction in the working week for other grades of staff, and to improve 
specified conditions of work. The RMT Regional Council campaigned vigorously to 
bolster support for the action, with its left-wing members again addressing a series of 
specially organised union branch meetings across the network, and distributing 
thousands of agitational leaflets in every station and depot. Central to their argument 
was that as a broad-based ‘industrial union’ it was necessary to defy management’s 
strategy of attempting to ‘buy-off’ the drivers whilst ‘holding the line’ for other 
sections. Not everybody agreed with the action. As one moderate RMT Regional 
Council rep argued:  
 
Things can be gained without necessarily going to the wire every time…I don’t agree with a 
hell of a lot of what management do, but when you talk to them you can bring management 
towards your view. And even if it is only a little way, you are getting something you wouldn’t 
have got had you not talked to them. 
 
Nonetheless, unlike the previous year, the response by RMT members was 
solid and each strike saw the cancellation of about 50 per cent of peak-time services 
and the closing of a number of Tube stations. The effectiveness of the strike was 
considerably enhanced when dozens of ASLEF drivers, unhappy about crossing 
RMT picket lines, transferred (or took out dual) membership of the RMT to enable 
them to join the action. Under the bold slogan ‘Joint Now, Strike Now’, printed on 
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posters and leaflets, the RMT Regional Council were also able to recruit about 700 
new members amongst station staff and other sections. When the RMT threatened 
to escalate the action by calling a 48-hour stoppage, LUL successfully sought an 
interim injunction banning the union from calling on newly-recruited members from 
striking, because they had not taken part in the original ballot which sanctioned it. 
The RMT called off its planned 48-hour stoppage, but threatened to organise a new 
ballot for action with a wider franchise. The dispute was finally resolved when 
management conceded a reduction in the working week to 40 hours for non-train 
staff. It represented a significant gain and appeared to vindicate the arguments of 
those left activists inside the RMT generally and the Regional Council specifically 
who campaigned for militant resistance to management. 
 
 This process was further encouraged with the formation of the Socialist 
Labour Party (SLP) the following year. The SLP was set up in the wake of the 
Labour Party’s annual conference decision to remove Clause Four from the party’s 
constitution, on the basis of far-left politics. It’s formation struck a chord amongst a 
small minority of workers disillusioned with Blair’s New Labour project, and the 
organisation pulled around it over 2,000 members across the country. It’s support 
was particularly strong inside the RMT on London Underground, where within a short 
period of time about 20 leading union activists had joined the new party, including 
Pat Sikorski, (secretary of the London Underground Regional Council) who became 
vice-president of the SLP, John Leach (national union executive member for the 
London Underground), and Bob Crow (ex-Underground worker and RMT Assistant-
General Secretary with responsibility for the Underground) who became chair of the 
SLP-initiated United Campaign to Repeal the Anti-Trade Union Laws2. The SLP 
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were able to claim support amongst many Regional Council delegates (mainly 
drivers) and half of the 11 members of the union’s national executive. This new left-
wing political grouping, which now had a well-organised chain of influence stretching 
from union reps into the union branches to the Regional Council through to the full-
time official and union executive, was to play an influential leadership role on the 
Underground, providing an industrial strategy of militant opposition to management 
backed up with a left-wing political edge. A small number of individual union reps 
from various Trotskyist organisations, despite political differences with the SLP, were 
broadly supportive of the Regional Council’s approach on industrial questions, and 
were themselves able to influence policy and activity in some union branches. 
Significantly, what united these different elements was a concentration on building 
up the strength of shopfloor organisation and confidence through collective struggle, 
as opposed to the traditional Communist Party ‘Broad Left’ emphasis on attempting 
to capture positions in the official union machine. 
 
 The first fruits of this organisation was to be seen almost immediately with the 
1996 annual pay and conditions claim, although, paradoxically, it was ASLEF who 
initiated industrial action on this occasion.  Despite an increased pay offer from 2.7 to 
3.2 per cent, the ASLEF leadership came under tremendous pressure from their 
driver members, who had become intensely frustrated at what they regarded as 
management’s attempt to renege on the previous years agreement to cut the 
working week and by the failure to move towards the longer term aim of a 35-hour 
week. The union balloted its 2,000 members and organised three official 24-hour 
stoppages that effectively paralysed most of the Underground service.  As an ASLEF 
driver on the Northern Line recalled: 
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The main thing after the Company Plan was the issue of a 5-day week for train staff. 1995 
had ended up in bitterness with the management promising that the 35-hour week was just 
around the corner. But when ’96 came they didn’t agree to it. In ’96 the [ASLEF] Executive 
Committee member [for the Underground] was up for re-election and he was under pressure 
to deliver. We had been losing some of the best activists to the RMT over previous disputes, 
and the activists were getting more and more pissed off, and the reps were getting grief from 
the members. So at the very start of the ’96 pay round ASLEF went straight to ballot, which is 
what RMT had done before. They tried to leapfrog the RMT in terms of militancy and 
organised a number of one-day stoppages. Management were in shock, they didn’t think it 
was going to happen. But the full-time officials were in a position where they had to deliver or 
their own personal positions were on the line.  
 
Despite being outmanoeuvred, the RMT Regional Council quickly organised a 
ballot of its own driver members (employed mainly on the Victoria and Central Lines) 
and then, establishing a fragile united front, organised with ASLEF a further four joint 
24-hour stoppages of work, on these occasions bringing the whole Underground 
network to a halt. For the first time since 1989 there was some effective solidarity 
between ASLEF and RMT drivers, with joint picket lines. This was a direct result of 
an explicit united front initiative taken by the left activists inside the RMT. However, 
another planned joint strike was called off after ASLEF’s leadership recommended 
acceptance of LUL’s improved three-year pay and hours package, which included a 
reduction of the working week to 35 hours for drivers by 1998, albeit in exchange for 
two years’ wage settlements at 2 per cent below the inflation rate. A threat of further 
unilateral strike action by the RMT was withdrawn after last minute talks when some 
further concessions were obtained on the deal. Although self-financing, the hours 
reduction, and the substantial increase in train staffing that followed, represented a 
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significant victory despite management belligerence (LUL, 1996). Nonetheless, the 
differences over the settlement negotiations had the effect of re-igniting old rivalries 
between the members of the two unions. 
 
 
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRIVATISATION: 1998-1999 
 
In 1997 there were two further RMT strike ballots over the annual pay claim, until 
management imposed a 2.7 per cent increase on non-train staff, and the following 
year the RMT organised two one-day stoppages of guards on the Northern Line over 
the phasing out of jobs. Otherwise during 1998-9, the main battleground became the 
campaign against the Public Private Partnership (PPP) of the Underground 
advocated by the New Labour government. Following the announcement of PPP in 
March 1998, ASLEF (whose driver members were regarded as not being directly 
affected) argued the need to take a pragmatic view. General Secretary Lew Adams 
insisted that only by involving the private sector could money be obtained for the 
Tube. ‘ASLEF will not play at ostrich and oppose a public-private investment 
package. It seems currently to be the only game in town’ (Evening Standard, 10 
March 1998). Despite concern over future job cuts, the union refused to organise any 
action against PPP. By contrast, the RMT mounted vigorous industrial and political 
opposition from the outset, on the basis that it should remain a publicly-owned 
industry. It demanded London Underground guarantee the job security of the 4,000 
engineering and train maintenance staff threatened with transfer to the private 
sector, and promise their existing terms and conditions of employment  (including 
pay, hours, holidays and pensions) be honoured, with no compulsory redundancies.  
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So as to avoid any legal challenge for organising industrial action on a 
‘political’ basis, and as a means of galvanising support for its threatened engineering 
members amongst drivers and station staff, the RMT linked opposition to PPP with a 
fight for the annual pay and conditions claim. This included the demand for a 35-hour 
week for all staff (and a four-day/32-hour week for drivers already on a 35-hour 
week) and the withdrawal of a new late and absence procedure. However, the semi-
privatisation threat was seen as the key area of concern for the union, with little 
immediate prospect of winning the other issues. Again the Regional Council 
campaigned across the network, with a series of much larger than usual union 
branch meetings that subsequently pulled a wide layer of members into leafleting 
and agitational activity amongst the broader membership. Following a 5-1 ballot 
majority the union organised one 24-hour and one 48-hour combine-wide stoppages 
of its entire 6,500-strong membership in the summer of 1998, on both occasions 
closing about two dozen stations and cutting services by half on some Underground 
lines during the rush hour. A Regional Council bulletin replied to the accusation it 
was attempting to propagate its own left-wing political aims: 
 
This, of course, is the oldest one in the book and it is used on a regular basis by LUL 
management…to attempt to deflect attention from the real issues. If by opposing the 
government’s plans for the future of LUL, which passengers, Londoners, and even the City of 
London know are wrong and which will destroy our members’ jobs, conditions, pensions and 
futures, it is meant that we are political, left-wingers or even revolutionary, then so be it! 
 
Again, not everyone agreed with this militant approach. One moderate RMT 
member on the Victoria Line insisted:  
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My personal opinion is that their tactics were ultra-left, they have been into battle quite often 
without looking to see if anyone is behind them...And I think management were thinking ‘Go 
ahead and fight, we know there will be disruption for a day or two but it’s not going to kill us. 
But the lack of effect will damage the members’ morale. 
 
The left inside the RMT, especially Sikorski and Crow, the two leading figures, 
responded with the argument that, like the miners in 1984-5, the RMT had no choice 
but to fight given the nature of the attack they faced. ‘We have to fight under 
circumstances not of our choosing, but unless we fight we’re going to get completely 
walked over’ was the essence of the argument that was carried inside the union. 
Further stoppages over New Year were called off after LUL successfully sought a 
High Court injunction on the basis that the union had left too long a gap between the 
previous stoppages and the planned strikes, and should re-ballot its members. But a 
new strike ballot early in 1999 produced an 85 per cent vote in favour of action, and 
the 48-hour strike, which was described as ‘unreasonable, unnecessary and 
damaging to the long-term future of the Underground’ by Transport Minister John 
Reid (Evening Standard, 16 February 1999), again severely affected services.  
 
However, the campaign of industrial action came to an end, despite a further 
consultative ballot of members showing an overwhelming majority against semi-
privatisation, when it became clear the union could not sustain support for further 
strike action amongst its drivers (a number of whom on the Central Line left the RMT 
to join ASLEF). The willingness of RMT drivers to take industrial action previously, 
given that PPP was not seen as directly affecting their jobs and conditions, revealed 
a high level of solidarity with other engineering-based union members. It was a vivid 
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testimony to the left’s success in their appeal for united action of all workers across 
the network. Yet in the face of determined management opposition, supported by the 
New Labour government, a number of drivers saw little value in further stoppages of 
work, at least until the details of the private sector transfer became apparent. In 
many respects this revealed the limitations of the left inside the union, as one 
sympathetic Victoria Line member explained: 
 
You have an RMT leadership that desperately wants to fight and wants to try and galvanise 
the membership to fight the kind of political struggle that is needed. But they have a 
membership that is a lot less sure. The leadership are well to the left of the membership, and 
the membership are not convinced of having a political strike. They make rational decisions 
about ‘Am I going to get something back for all the money I’m losing’. But it is very difficult to 
see how you are going to stop privatisation through limited strike action anyway. 
 
In the meantime, the union launched a new broader political campaign of 
opposition to New Labour’s privatisation plans aimed at galvanising public opinion 
and support from a wider layer of Underground passengerst. With Ken Livingstone’s 
candidacy for Mayor of the new London Assembly effectively becoming a 
referendum on the issue, the RMT Regional Council set up a Campaign Against 
Tube Privatisation which stood eleven union officials and activists in different 
constituencies across London, polling 17,400 votes (1 per cent), although it 
eschewed a joint political campaign with the (more successful) newly-formed London 
Socialist Alliance. 
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ASSESMENT AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
After outlining the changing contours of industrial relations and trade unionism on the 
London Underground over the last few years, it is now possible to reconsider the two 
central research questions, namely to what extent is left-wing political leadership 
important and is militant unionism self-defeating?  
 
First, the case study provides strong evidence of the significant leadership 
role played by left-wing political activists inside the RMT on the London 
Underground. The left has clearly been instrumental in shaping the union’s militant 
stance towards management and in mobilising the membership to engage in 
industrial action over the last few years. Since 1991 the Regional Council has 
organised no less than 19 strike ballots with 17 days of action, a marked contrast 
with ASLEF’s record over the same period. Of course, this militancy has not merely 
been a reflection of the preferences of the union’s left leadership, unaffected by 
external constraints and pressures. Thus, London Underground management’s 
general industrial relations belligerence (particularly towards the RMT) and the 
impending threat posed to jobs and conditions by privatisation, have all acted to 
sustain such militancy and create conditions in which there has been little basis for 
the type of ‘social partnership’ advocated by many commentators. Similarly, the 
monopoly public service context in which Underground passenger demand and 
services have continued to grow rapidly, and where the hard-faced realities of 
viability and compulsory redundancies common to many other industries have been 
felt less acutely, has encouraged workers’ self-confidence and provided favourable 
opportunity structures for collective action. The RMT’s broader-based union 
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membership and weaker bargaining position compared with ASLEF, also needs to 
be taken into account in explaining why they have engaged in strike action so 
frequently.  
 
On the other hand, workers did not just respond automatically to 
environmental opportunities (and limitations). On the contrary, the role of union 
leadership in focusing workers’ varied grievances upon common objectives to ensure 
united action was also of central importance. Certainly, it would be mistaken to 
ignore or downplay the significance of the conscious layer of left-wing RMT activists 
who have also contributed to shaping the contours of trade unionism on the 
Underground in a distinctively adversarial fashion.  
 
This influence was particularly evident during 1996-9, when the Socialist 
Labour Party’s advocacy of militant industrial struggle, supported by other individual 
Trotskyist activists, appears to have fitted a situation where many union members 
felt the only alternative to resistance would be capitulation and the collapse of union 
organisation. In this sense, the development of a layer of left-wing activists reflected 
something very real inside the RMT on London Underground. In turn, this network of 
left activists played a crucial role in successfully articulating the wider memberships 
sense of injustice, targeting it at management and organising repeated bouts of 
collective action. They were able to do so in a context in which there does not 
appear to have been the same degree of separation of union activists from the shop-
floor as is common in many other industries (which often makes it impossible to carry 
the arguments to each individual worker) and yet in circumstances where the 
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organised left, again unlike elsewhere, has also been well represented at every level 
of union organisation from local rep through to the national executive.   
 
Of course, it is true the willingness of ASLEF members to vote in favour of, 
and sometimes engage in, strike action despite the lack of a left political leadership 
similar to that inside the RMT, provides evidence of the objective scale of bitterness 
many London Underground workers have felt towards management in recent years. 
But the contrast between the two unions in terms of the sheer level and nature of 
combativity is to be explained not merely in terms of management’s differential 
approach or the unions’ relative bargaining positions, but also by the extent to which 
there have been a subjective layer of left-wing activists inside the RMT workforce 
capable of standing up and arguing with their fellow workers, pressing a course of 
action different to that proposed by more moderate individuals, and enthusing 
workers with both the ideological legitimacy and practical confidence to resist 
management. 
 
In 1999 the left’s influence inside the union more broadly was reflected in 
union elections for a number of key national positions in which both the SLP and (the 
Trotskyist) Socialist Outlook stood candidates against existing officials, including the 
General Secretary, Jimmy Knapp. Campaigning on the basis that Knapp and others 
had showed a lack of vigour in fighting PPP, and were wary of distancing themselves 
too much from the Labour government, the left received very high votes in support. 
For example, Pat Sikorski came very close to defeating siting candidate Vernon 
Hince (vice-chairman of the Labour Party and a member of Labour’s National 
Executive Committee) for Assistant General Secretary3. By contrast, the left does not 
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have a base on the Underground inside ASLEF. As one isolated ASLEF socialist 
driver explained: 
 
It’s very difficult to find left activists in ASLEF [on the Underground]. Because the RMT has 
much more militant rhetoric – it says ‘we’re an industrial union not a craft union’ – there is a 
tendency for the best Left people to join the RMT. Which in turn leaves the right in control of 
ASLEF. 
 
However, significantly, more recently the SLP project has recently begun to 
fray at the edges. Individual members SLP members on the RMT executive have 
been criticised for fudging their differences with Jimmy Knapp to avoid undermining 
his links with the Labour Party leadership. On the Underground, the cohesiveness of 
SLP organisation has been undermined by political and tactical disputes, and some 
members have left the organisation including Sikorski, who has recently been 
disciplined by the national executive for alleged ‘unofficial’ electoral activity. 
Meanwhile, the party generally has been plagued by feuds over policy and the level 
of internal democracy.  
 
Second, there is the question of a militant union strategy. In terms of Kelly’s 
(1996) definition of militancy, based on ambitious demands, strong reliance on 
mobilisation of union membership, emphasis on collective bargaining, the frequent 
threat or use of industrial action, and an ideology of conflicting interests, the RMT on 
London Underground has undoubtedly been a ‘militant’ union during the 1990s, and 
its membership have responded in kind. As Bob Crow, RMT Assistant General 
Secretary with responsibility for the Underground explained: 
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We believe in a fighting union, that you get more benefits and win concessions from the 
employers if the members are prepared to take action. We’ve probably had more strike ballots 
than the rest of the trade union movement put together. And we’ve never lost one of them. 
 
 But this still leaves the argument as to the efficacy of union militancy. In some 
respects it is difficult to make a judgement on this by comparing the RMT with 
ASLEF, given their rather different bargaining positions and treatment by 
management. It could be argued that each union was merely following the strategy 
that was most appropriate to its situation. Yet arguably it is still possible, and useful, 
to make some comparisons about the effect of the RMT’s militant strategy. On this 
the evidence from the case study appears to be mixed. On the one hand, there have 
been a number of strengths. For example, it is evident that RMT union/labour 
militancy has achieved some real material gains, for example in 1996 it was crucial 
to finally achieving a significant cut in the working week for drivers and winning 
concessions for other grades. Moreover, even when material improvements have not 
been made, militancy appears to have helped to defend existing conditions from 
attack and prevented the victimisation of a leading activist. An RMT member on the 
Victoria Line explained: 
 
The left has a huge influence in the RMT and it means that there has been a political 
campaign against privatisation that has made people politically aware. At a time when the 
industry as a whole has been massively battered, with huge job losses on BR, the fact that 
RMT have fought all the time has meant that management have been more slow in pushing 
things through than they would have been anyway. People are a lot better off than they might 
have been because RMT have fought, in terms of defending basic working conditions.  
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 Whilst RMT militancy has been doubled-edged in terms of union recruitment, 
leading to some gains in 1996 (of a few hundred) and losses in 1999 (of a few 
dozen), it has generally helped to build the strength and vitality of collective union 
organisation in terms of the numbers of activists involved and the level of political 
discussion in the union branches. As an ASLEF member on the Piccadilly Line 
acknowledged: 
 
They have built a lot of good trade unionists, they have developed some new people from 
below, a group of activists. They have good leaflets and political propaganda coming out, and 
they send people around the system leafleting and signing up new members. They have 
involved people in action. And that has had an impact in keeping union structures alive at a 
time when they have been fighting on the defensive all the time. It is quite possible that 
without this willingness to fight, the union organisation could have become completely passive 
and simply a rubber stamp for management. 
 
 In addition, the RMT militancy has put some pressure on the ASLEF 
leadership from sections of their members unhappy with a more cautious approach, 
reflected in the important election of a SLP member as General Secretary.  
 
On the other hand, there have also been some significant weaknesses. The 
most important of these are the traditional sectional divisions between the RMT and 
ASLEF. On its own, the RMT are unable to deliver a fully effective strike. To do so 
would require stopping the trains completely and that would require winning joint 
action with ASLEF members, if necessary appealing to them to act in defiance of 
their own union leadership. But the RMT left has not contributed to achieving this, as 
one union activist on the Piccadilly Line acknowledged: 
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The relationship between RMT and ASLEF is diabolical, really low. There is a whole history, a 
huge number of disputes in which [the RMT] has said ‘Come out on strike and support us, join 
the RMT’. It’s usually a poaching exercise and that breaks down into personally slagging 
people off, and it has become very bitter. Although the left in the RMT have said they want to 
build bridges with ASLEF to get unity in action, in reality the bitterness from all the disputes 
has led them to say that ASLEF is the main enemy. The main problem is that drivers are 
clearly the strongest section, they can close the network down on their own. RMT can’t close 
the Underground down. So strikes aren’t that effective, because drivers are going into work. 
So then it’s: ‘ASLEF are to blame’.  
 
The problem has been compounded by RMT unwillingness to try and build a 
permanent close relationship with ASLEF activists, and to encourage the 
development of a left current than could challenge the ASLEF leadership from below. 
The RMT left’s approach has proved counter-productive in terms of exacerbating 
sectional divisions that have only benefited management. However, it is possible the 
election of a new left-wing ASLEF General Secretary may herald a change in this 
relationship, reflected by a jointly organised political publicity campaign against PPP 
(‘Listen to London – Save Our Tube’) launched in August 1999 by leaders of both 
unions. 
 
Another weakness has been that the RMT’s militancy has been conducted 
within a very unfavourable environment in terms of trade union confidence and strike 
activity generally in Britain. Certainly, the problems recently encountered in mounting 
opposition to PPP have highlighted the limits of left-wing leadership in overcoming 
some members concerns about the immediate costs and benefits involved in 
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sustaining industrial action when the overall chances of success seem slim. An 
ASLEF member on the Northern Line explained: 
 
The problem is that RMT are trying to pursue a big political strategy at a time when the 
working class as a whole is extremely passive. If you can’t have socialism in one country then 
you can’t have revolutionary trade union strategy in one part of industry. The consciousness 
of workers on the Underground is affected not just by what happens on the Underground but 
also by the whole world around them. They are affected by the Evening Standard, which says 
‘these are just a bunch of left-wingers with political aims’. And Britain has the lowest level of 
strikes ever. So it is very difficult for the RMT. Because the scale of the fight that is needed 
against all the attacks is so huge it needs much larger working class resistance to pull it off. 
Fighting in one isolated group is extremely difficult…The RMT can’t even deliver all-out action 
against PPP, they can only muster one-day strikes, but it is very difficult to see how that’s 
going to stop privatisation. 
 
 If the public sector monopoly context has encouraged a higher degree of 
workers’ confidence and willingness to engage in militant activity compared with 
most other industries, the general retreat of the British working class movement, 
combined with the rejection of militancy and acceptance of ‘Social Partnership’ by 
many unions, has undoubtedly conditioned and constrained its potential success. 
Despite the left’s influence within the RMT, it has proved to be too small and 
insufficiently rooted amongst the mass of members to overcome such broader 
contextual limitations. In addition, there has also been the subjective weakness of 
the left’s predominately industrial-based form of agitation that has only recently 
recognised the need to be part of a much broader political campaign with other 
social forces and movements. Even if, despite such problems, militant trade 
unionism generally on the London Underground has been relatively successful in the 
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past, it may prove much more difficult in the future within a more hostile and part-
privatised environment. 
 
 Although the RMT’s militant strategy has had mixed fortunes the scale of the 
challenge posed by London Underground has meant that RMT survival has to a 
considerable degree depended upon the willingness of the membership to defend 
the union from attack by engaging in collective action. By contrast, a rather different 
type of pragmatic and sectional trade unionism has delivered some gains for ASLEF. 
But this appears to have had more to do with their more strategic bargaining position 
compared with the RMT, management’s attempt to use them (as an ‘elite’ union with 
an homogeneous membership embracing the bulk of drivers) as a wedge to split the 
RMT (with its broader worker representation), and with ASLEF’s willingness to 
threaten and occasionally engage in industrial action (sometimes benefiting from 
RMT militancy), than as a consequence of any more moderate union strategy. 
Moreover, ASLEF’s alternative approach has merely fed the sectional divisions 
between the unions, something that could become even more problematic with the 
introduction of PPP and the fragmentation of bargaining between different 
companies that will ensue.  
 
 In conclusion, whilst Kelly (1996) seems justified in arguing that militant trade 
unionism is ultimately sustained by the hostility of employers to independent trade 
unionism and by the antagonistic interests of workers and employers, the London 
Underground provides further evidence of the process by which left-wing political 
leadership can also play a crucial role in mobilising workers collectively to resist 
management. It also suggests that the much-heralded New Labour/TUC model of 
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‘social partnership’ is likely to continue to be challenged by so-called ‘old-fashioned’ 
traditions of industrial militancy, even if this militancy appears to be confined (at the 
moment at least) to only certain industries. Whilst the distinctive public-sector 
monopoly service context of the London Underground (as in the Royal Mail and Fire 
Service) goes some way to explaining this resilience, it seems justifiable to suggest 
that without much more extensive research into the influence that left-wing activists 
can exert in the workplace and unions, the merits of different industrial and political 
strategies vis-à-vis management will remain only a partially understood phenomena.  
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NOTES 
  
1 The other main union is the Transport Salaried Staff Association with about 1,000 members on the 
Underground. 
2 The United Campaign to Repeal the Anti-Trade Union Laws was founded in at a conference held in March 
1998. Its three objectives are to secure the repeal of all the Conservatives trade union laws, to secure the 
introduction of new laws which enshrine the right of workers to take industrial action, and to support workers 
and unions penalised or threatened by union legislation. A number of trade unions have backed the campaign, 
including RMT, ASLEF, NUM, FBU, BFAWU and UCATT. 
3 SLP member and executive member Mick Atherton stood for President against a Labour stalwart, John 
Cogger; Socialist Outlook supporter and ex-Lambeth councillor Greg Tucker stood for General Secretary 
against long-standing RMT leader Jimmy Knapp (winning 4,535 votes to 8,776); and Pat Sikorski, the SLP’s 
former Vice-President, stood for Assistant General Secretary against Vernon Hince, vice-chairman of the 
Labour Party and a member of Labour’s National Executive Committee (winning 4,521 votes to 5,421). Jimmy 
Knapp, who polled 66 per cent of the vote, described his re-election as ‘a major defeat for those on the ultra-left 
who put their politics above the interests of union members’ (Evening Standard, 1 April 1999). 
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